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SACE outline

Example 1 - Delivery robot
Example 2 - Self‐driving car
Note 1 - Defining capabilities
Note 2 - Iterative process
AS concept definition [A]

Example 3 - Autonomous cars
Example 4 - Office environment
Example 5 - Defining people
Note 3 - Challenges when defining an ODM

Example 6 - Office environment
Example 7 - Autonomous vehicle scenario
Note 4 - Scenes and scenarios
Note 5 - Resilience

AS operating context assurance argument pattern [G]

Example 8 - ODM and identified interactions
Note 8 - Mission and non-mission interactions

Example 9 - Decision point for an autonomous robot
Example 10 - Enumerated situations for an autonomous robot
Example 11 - Autonomous car turning at a roundabout
Example 12 - Autonomous insulin pump
Example 13 - Autonomous robot
Example 14 - Autonomous car
Example 15 - Autonomous insulin pump

Example 16 - Hazardous scenarios
Note 9 - System environmental belief state

AS hazardous scenarios assurance case pattern [I]

Example 24 - Different tiers of an autonomous system
Note 14 - Intent of the safety requirements
Note 15 - Decomposing safety requirements
Note 16 - Link between safety requirements and the design process
Note 17 - Machine learning

Note 18 - Relationships between safety requirements

Safety requirements argument pattern [S]

Note 19 - Definition of system architecture
Note 20 - Logical and physical structure of the system
Note 21 - Diversity in architecture redundancy
Note 22 - Fault tolerance approaches
Design process for tier n [X]

Note 23 - Independent reviewers

AS design assurance argument pattern [U]

Example 25 - Autonomous passenger shuttle
Note 24 - HAZOP analysis

Example 26 - Sensors for autonomous robot

AS hazardous failures argument pattern [DD]

Example 29 - Drone in severe weather conditions
Description of key features of environment outside ODM [FF]

Example 30 - Autonomous car leaving a motorway
Example 31 - Car's rainfall sensor
Note 27 - Challenges to recognising the ODM boundary

Example 32
ODM transition model [JJ]

Example 33 - Satellite ‘safe modes’
Note 28 - Handover
Stakeholder risk acceptance definition [LL]

AS Hazardous Scenarios Assurance Case Pattern PP [PP]

Example 34 - In‐the‐loop simulation

AS verification Log [SS]

AS verification argument pattern [UU]

Instantiate SOC assurance argument pattern

This activity requires as input the SOC assurance argument pattern ([N]), as well as the artefacts from Activities 10 and 11 ([L]and [M]). The activity uses these artefacts to create an instantiated AS operating context assurance argument ([O]) which demonstrates that the defined SOC sufficiently mitigates the hazardous scenarios identified for the AS operation.

Continue to: Artefact N. SOC argument pattern
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